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Different standards in pesticides and pest protection have often been used as trade 
barriers, whether real or manufactured.  While harmonization is often touted as a 
means to limit the ability of domestic (protectionist) interests to use standards as a 
barrier to trade, the process of harmonization itself is subject to rent-seeking.  In this 
paper, we explore the harmonization of standards that affect pesticide use in NAFTA 
and ask whether the process is benefiting any groups more than others.   There is 
evidence that patented pesticide producers have greater access to the harmonization 
process and may be using harmonization to raise costs to their rivals while preserving 
their ability to price discriminate.   1
Introduction 
 
Harmonization of environmental standards is often seen as a panacea – limiting 
the use of differential standards as a trade barrier, and blocking a potential ‘race to the 
bottom’ where countries use declining environmental standards as a source of 
competitive advantage. Although it is widely recognized that industries lobby to affect 
the setting of domestic environmental standards, including using them as a source of 
protectionism, it is less often recognized that the harmonization process itself is subject 
to rent-seeking.  This paper uses harmonization of pesticide regulation in NAFTA to 
consider the role of various interest groups in determining what rules get harmonized, 
and to what standards.   
 
Intensive agro-chemical use is a central component in modern food production; 
government regulation of chemical use and phyto-sanitary rules are key elements in 
assuring food meets consumer, health and environmental safety standards.   Pesticide 
regulations can act as barriers to trade, hindering both trade of chemicals and 
agricultural production. Finding an appropriate balance between trade liberalization 
and environmental, health and consumer protection has been a well-publicized issue in 
academic and policy circles. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
provides an opportunity to investigate the process of regulatory harmonization under 
trade.  In this paper, we ask what has been the degree of harmonization in pesticide 
regulations in the three NAFTA countries?  Second, we ask whether there are specific 
policy areas where harmonization has not been achieved, and if so, why?  We hope to 
provide a better understanding of the process of harmonization, how it relates to the 
various stakeholder groups and its implications for trade and the environment in the 
three countries. 
 
In this paper, we first review some theoretical literature on environmental 
standards and harmonization under trade to determine the costs and benefits from 
harmonization.  Next, we discuss the market structure in the pesticide industry, to 
identify the different actors and different roles for regulation.  We then give a brief 
background on pesticide regulation in the three countries and we discuss the attempts 
to create international standards affecting pesticides and plant and animal health.   
Section five presents the various interest groups and, using two simple economic 
models, walks through their presumed objectives from harmonization.  The section 
ends by posing various hypotheses on the results from harmonization.  Next, we 
consider the observed results from harmonization and compare them to our 
hypotheses to determine which groups appear to be dominating the process.  We end 
with conclusions and recommendations. 
 
Harmonization of Environmental Regulations 
 
To understand the issues around the harmonization of standards, one first 
needs to understand the purpose of standards.  Standards can address a number of 
market imperfections and failures.  Many standards are meant to address asymmetric 
information, such as labelling standards or efficacy standards on pesticides to   2
decrease transaction costs and avoid the lemons problem.  Environmental standards 
are generally meant to limit the production of externalities and to provide public goods.  
For example, regulations over chemical use can limit the pollution entering the 
environment.  Food quality and worker safety requirements can raise the average 
health status in an economy, with spill over benefits into higher productivity.  
 
Standards are not costless.  Often standards impose a fixed cost on firms in 
terms of product design, testing and certification. Many standards also involve 
recurring costs such as maintaining quality control, training and other increased 
marginal costs associated with producing a higher-quality product.  To the extent costs 
are fixed, standards can provide an advantage to large firms in global competition 
(Maskus and Wilson, 2000).  
 
Each country develops its own standards – many of which are complex, 
multidimensional and therefore not easily coordinated or ranked.  Domestic regulations 
reflect the culture, development and other features of the home country, usually 
addressing national problems (Meilke, 2001). These different standards can lead to 
trade tensions, increase costs to exporters and raise concerns among domestic 
producers who believe they are facing ‘unfair’ competition.  Nonetheless, these 
standards have been created to meet a domestic political bargain, (or a domestic 
social optimum if one feels optimistic about the local government), and therefore one 
would anticipate imposing a constraint of harmonization will lead to a standard that is 
desired less domestically.   
 
When is it beneficial to harmonize standards across countries?  Standard trade 
theory is based on comparative advantage, and Krugman (1997) and Bhagwati (2003) 
have noted that one potential source of comparative advantage is different standards 
across countries.  As long as these standards regulate domestic externalities, there is 
no (trade) reason for the country with higher standards to harmonize.  A second 
argument against harmonization is that environmental regulations in a country are 
presumably geared to its specific environmental needs.  The nature of externalities 
may vary by country, which implies that the first best solution is different standard in 
each country.  Given that some externalities are difficult to measure, they are often 
addressed by process standards, which in turn will vary with local technology.  Further, 
different countries will have different demands for environmental quality. For example, 
the demand for public goods will depend on income levels, relative endowments of 
factors, information, technologies, and other variables (Maskus and Wilson, 2000).   
Thus, the derived demand for standards is expected to be quite different between 
countries, particularly between countries in different stages of development (Krugman, 
1997; Bhagwati, 2003; Vogel, 2000; Maskus and Wilson, 2000).  Last, as indicated 
above, since domestic regulations are part of a domestic bargain, local groups may 
feel they have more input in this process, and therefore be more likely to support 
(comply to and/or monitor) regulations set at a domestic level, as opposed to those set 
internationally.  The more the international harmonization process is inaccessible and 
obscure, the more likely domestic groups will prefer locally-determined regulations. 
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There are a number of counterarguments that make a case for (some) 
harmonization of standards.  Forcing companies to meet different standards increases 
transactions costs, and the potential reduction in cost may outweigh the decrease in 
comparative advantage (Baldwin, 2000).   For example, if each country required a 
separate test for the toxicity level of a pesticide, it will make registering a product in 
multiple countries difficult (and expensive) whereas perhaps only one test is sufficient.   
Second, in a related argument, differential standards can segment markets, by 
erecting barriers to entry and increasing market power.  If some of the firms are 
involved in both markets, they can use these barriers to engage in price discrimination.  
Third, harmonization is needed to address externalities that are international in nature.  
Pest movement and some environmental externalities caused by pesticides are not 
constrained by national borders, and as immigration grows, some health concerns are 
increasingly international in scope.  Third, lack of harmonization can be used as an 
argument for using regulations as a barrier to trade (as noted above).  Equally, 
differential standards may allow producers in one country to argue for lower 
environmental regulations because their competitors have an ‘unfair comparative 
advantage’ otherwise (Vogel, 2000).  This argument has certainly been used in the 
United States to protect the use of methyl bromide past the date when developed 
countries were supposed to ban its use.  Fourth, since regulations can be used as 
barriers to trade, harmonization can place constraints on the ability of governments to 
set discriminatory standards.  There are numerous examples where the domestic 
industry managed the regulatory agenda, usually in an effort to protect themselves 
from competition.  Examples include U.S. CAFE standards which primarily penalized 
foreign car importers, and gasoline reformulation requirements which set different 
baselines for domestic and international firms (Vogel 1998) to name a few.  Therefore, 
limiting the more distortionary options by imposing harmonization may improve 
domestic as well as international welfare. 
 
Background on the Pesticide Industry 
 
When studying the effect of regulatory harmonization, one needs to consider the 
specific attributes of the pesticide market.  Not all pesticide firms are the same, and 
their goals from harmonization are equally different.  The pesticide market can be 
loosely thought of as consisting of two groups: the first group is comprised of large, 
multinational firms specializing in developing and selling patented products. The bulk 
of business for the companies in this group is largely high value, proprietary products, 
while including some off-patent chemicals, with lower profit margins. Crop Life is their 
internationally-active lobby group. The second group includes firms which license 
these products and produce them when they are off-patent. This second group is 
generally comprised of smaller national companies and operates without a 
multinational lobby group. Thus, one can conceive of production occurring either by 
oligopolistic patent-holding firms, or the competitive fringe, producing generic products. 
 
Whether producing patent products or generics, the are two types of operations 
in pesticide industries:  one is the ‘real or true’ manufacturer, which is a firm that starts 
with  raw materials or basic chemicals and produces or synthesizes from them the   4
active ingredients (AI) which are the essence of the pesticide or drug. The AI, which 
normally is produced at high levels of concentration (80-98% purity) is then ‘formulated’ 
or diluted into a commercial product (usually 50% or less concentration) by a firm – 
usually called a ‘formulator’ – and put in such a form that allows it to be sprayed or 
broadcast.  The farmer then dissolves or prepares a solution mainly using water as a 
vehicle, to reach the crops targeting the pest at economic levels and acceptable levels 
of safety. The first level is the more sophisticated process, requiring an industrial plant 
or factory whereas the second is a simple process needing less advanced facilities.  
The first type of operation is primarily located in Europe, the United States and Japan 
(e.g. Monsanto, Dow AgroSciences, BASF) and there is limited AI production in 
Canada and in Mexico, mainly the last phases in products like 2,4-D, glyphosate and 
some older organo-phosphate (OP) insecticides.  However all three countries have 
formulators. Producers of patented products will generally use subsidiaries as their 
formulators, whereas generic formulators exist and are sometimes able to access their 
AIs from China and India.   
 
Once patent protection lapses, a product becomes “generic”, i.e. any company 
can manufacture and sell it.  But this does not imply market accessibility; it is one thing 
to be able to source and manufacture the product, the other is being able to get it 
registered.  Without registration, a pesticide cannot be sold.  Registration requires 
information packages containing details not only about industrial production but also 
about efficacy, toxicology, environmental impact, formulation, inert ingredients, labels, 
compatibility with other products, etc. It is here where the lack of harmonized 
regulations plays a vital role in protecting business and limiting competition; the 
industrial process maybe open to smaller entrants, but the regulatory package or 
information on efficacy, environmental and health safety is still owned by the original 
company.  Thus, successful application for registration of a generic pesticide can 
become difficult unless an agreement is reached with the original owner of the product 
and its regulatory information. In the United States, companies can have access by 
paying for file sharing from the original registrants, to access their own registration, but 
after ten years of harmonizing efforts, in Mexico generic producers do not have the 
same possibilities as their counterparts in USA.   
 
A second method used by the patent firms to compete against their generic 
counterparts is vertical integration.  Consider the glyphosate herbicide business; 
before patent expiration around the year 2000, the only firm in the market was 
Monsanto with Round up™ and variations of the same product. Monsanto has 
managed the loss of patent superbly by placing emphasis on plant capacity, costs, raw 
material advantages and the signing of licensing agreements with the main 
competitors like Syngenta, Dow, Cheminova, Nufarm, BASF and others to supply their 
glyphosate and support their efforts in accessing registration, while legally challenging 
firms outside their control (Agrow, 2006).       
 
The agrochemical and pesticide industry has undergone rapid consolidation in 
the last decade at the global level (Table 1). For most of the last century, the chemical 
industry had built its base on several pillars: the pharmaceutical industry, bulk   5
chemicals, specialty or fine chemicals and agrochemicals. In the late 1980´s, most 
companies started divesting their strategic units and in the 1990´s and a stagnant 
world pesticide market triggered several major rounds of consolidation. Corporations 
initiated a rationalization drive, bringing about a smaller group of financially stronger 
companies whose strategy has been aimed at pursuing the high-value, patent-
protected, specialized markets of pesticides and recently, seed and biotechnology.   
Bayer CropScience, the largest company in the sector came about through the 
acquisition of one the leading German competitors, Aventis, a subsidiary of the large 
conglomerate Hoechst, which itself had been created by consolidating the agricultural 
interests of several European and American companies.  Another leading example is 
Monsanto, which acquired major seed companies around the world for their biotech-
pesticide strategic linkage, like Agrow, DeKalb (corn, sorghum, alfalfa), Delta Pine 
(cotton), Seminis (horticulture) and setting up a separate entity for pharmaceutical 
business under the name of Pharmacia.  As a result of this process (Table 2), the new 
enlarged agrochemical companies have amassed a large list of active ingredients 
(AI´s) which comprise high-value patent protected compounds and biotechnology traits 
along with their generic or off-patent agrochemicals.  
 
Some authors (Ollinger and Fernandez-Cornejo, 1998) argue that this 
consolidation has been helped by the increase in environmental regulation. Research 
& Development, (R&D) expenditures in environmental clearance of new products is 
more expensive with increased liability issues.  Second, as registration takes longer, 
there is less time left on the patent when the product finally gets to market.  Since all of 
these added costs are fixed, they all increase the economies of scale.   
 
Table 1:  Consolidation Intensity – Top 6 Firms, 2004 and 1995 
Company      Nationality  Turnover  Market        Sales           Market   
    US$  billion  Share            US$ billion        Share 
 
    2004   2004    1995                1995 
Bayer    German  6.1    19%    Ciba   3.3            11%    
Syngenta  Swiss   6.0   18%      Monsanto  2.4               8 % 
BASF   German  4.1   13%      Bayer 2.37               8% 
Dow   USA   3.4   11%      Zeneca  2.36               7% 
Monsanto USA    3.4   11%      Agrevo  2.34               7% 
Dupont  USA   3.2   10%      Dupont  2.32               7% 
 
Total industry               32.6    100%            30.0            
 100% 
Top six companies             25.05      77%            15.0               50%   
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 Table 2: Recent Global Agrochemical Industry Consolidation Path 
Current Corporation                      Predecessors/Former Units or Companies 
Bayer Crop Science  Bayer, Aventis, Hoechst, Schering, Roussel, Rhone-
Poulenc, Union Carbide, Gustafson 
 
Syngenta  Zeneca, ICI, Stauffer, Ciba-Geigy, MSD, ISK, Sandoz 
BASF      BASF,  American  Cyanamid,  Microflo 
 
Dow           Dow, Eli Lilly, Rohm & Haas 
      
Monsanto Monsanto,  Haarz  Seed, Seminis, Asgrow, DeKalb 
Genetics 
 
Dupont Ag        Dupont, Pioneer Hybrids; Griffin 
 
 
Consolidation is also occurring over products.  Too many products can turn into 
high, slow moving inventories due to the highly seasonal nature of the business and 
can cause financial difficulties since keeping toxicological and environmental packages 
up to date in different countries around the world is a challenge and an expensive 
exercise. In response to increasingly stringent environmental and health regulations 
companies are now marketing fewer high value specialty chemicals.  For example 
BASF has declared that it will concentrate on proprietary products (high value-patent 
protected), a move recently confirmed by the sale of Microflo, a generics producer it 
had acquired in the United States less than six years ago, to the Japanese company 
Arysta in March 2006.  BASF has also announced its intention to go from more than 
300 actives in 2000 to around 100 by end 2006, ultimately focusing on about 60 core 
active ingredients.  
 
Additionally, one recent strategy by corporations has been to identify the top ten 
crops and pests by crop around the world, focusing R&D efforts more narrowly for 
larger financial rewards, leaving smaller crops without chemical protection (Figure 1) 
(Ollinger et al., 1998). This consolidation is a matter of concern for governments and 
farmers, particularly those that produce minor crops within their country or even in 
cases where crops are of ´only´ national importance such as agave in Mexico. The 
regulators and the industry blame each other but have been unable to cooperate 
(harmonize) and design a system that allows for low cost registration for pesticides for 
‘minor crop use’. In California, in 1997, 19 crops of the total of 350 commodities 
produced in the state consumed 83 percent of all pesticides and 71 percent of all 
applications; with only four pesticides accounting for close to 70 percent of the total 
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Figure 1: Agrochemicals by Crop in the World in 1995 





















Pesticides generally have very price inelastic demand schedules (McEwan and 
Deen, 1997; Lichtenberg and Zilberman, 1998).  Because of this, market growth 
occurs primarily through expansion of acreage (Fox and Weersink, 1995).  In the last 
20 years, the global market for agrochemicals had been stagnant, with a slight 
increase in the quantity of herbicides used, but a decrease in the use of insecticides.  
The adoption of soil conservation tillage and biotechnology coupled with low 
commodity prices may be some causes behind the decline. For the first time in the 
past ten years, in 2004 global trade in agrochemicals has increased (4.6 percent) 
primarily due to increasing demand in developing countries, in particular the two main 
Latin American markets, Brazil and Argentina as well as an increase in China.   
 
Background on Pesticide Regulation 
 
Regulations affecting pesticides are particularly complex as they involve setting 
standards at several market levels.  Since pesticides are an input, there are product 
regulations governing both the pesticide itself and the end agricultural product, as well 
as being process standards associated with the use of pesticides in the production of 
the final good.  Further, since pesticides are meant to address a threat to agricultural 
production, there are regulations that govern the pest itself that affect pesticide use.  
Thus, harmonization may occur over regulations on the final good, for example a 
tomato, which faces regulations over the maximum pesticide residue allowed.   
Harmonization may also occur over regulations governing the pesticide’s registration 
which is determined by criteria including its efficacy, toxicity levels, etc.  Further, each 
country has different use (or process) regulations that govern such issues as how and 
when the pesticide is applied, how soon farm workers can enter the sprayed field.  
These regulations are intended to minimize health hazards for farm workers and   8
negative environmental externalities.  Last, there are rules to protect plant and animal 
safety that govern the transmission of the pests themselves.  Each country has 
sanitary and phytosanitary regulations that can be used to block imports of an 
agricultural product if it is shown that the product would introduce a new pest or 
disease. 
 
The United States has had a long tradition of having pesticide regulation, 
starting with the Federal Insecticide Act enacted in 1910, and evolving into the Federal 
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) under the control of USDA in 1947, 
and moving to the EPA with its creation in the 1970´s.  Canada and Mexico, following 
the United States, had dealt with pesticide regulation mainly under the ministries of 
agriculture since the last century.  In 1995, jurisdiction in Canada was transferred to 
the Pest Management Regulatory Agency (PMRA) under the Ministry of Health and in 
2005 in Mexico it came under the Comision Federal para la Prevencion de Riesgos 
Sanitarios (COFEPRIS) also under the Ministry of Health.  The profile of these 
agencies and their national political clout is different between the three countries, 
which makes agreements across borders challenging.  
 
A number of significant changes in domestic regulations have occurred since 
NAFTA was implemented. In the United States, the Food Quality Protection Act 
(FQPA) was adopted in August 1996 and draws innovative elements into the 
regulatory framework such as the notion, of using health issues as the most relevant 
criteria of approval for pesticides.  This change includes measuring the cumulative 
effects of various pesticides and a new safety standard for pesticide residues 
emphasizing the health of infants and children.  Lastly, the FQPA requires that all 
pesticides will be reviewed periodically (EPA, 2006a). 
The first major change to the regulatory framework was that the FQPA 
established a rule that each pesticide must be found to have a “reasonable certainty 
that no harm will result from aggregate exposure.”  This is a fundamental change, 
effectively incorporating the precautionary principle in U.S. regulation.  Thus, absence 
of data showing the product is harmful is not sufficient to deem that the product is safe 
(Swinton, 2001).   
A second fundamental change is that all sources of exposure, whether they 
come from food, drinking water, household and other non-agricultural uses should be 
considered when setting tolerance levels (maximum limits for pesticide residues in 
foods).  It also considers the cumulative effects of pesticides and other substances with 
common mechanisms of toxicity.  In the past, each pesticide and its toxicity level was 
assessed by US regulators individually, the new FQPA approach modified the risk 
assessment model by looking at the interaction of several pesticides with each other 
and their impact on the environment and humans.  This ‘whole cup’ approach is 
innovative, but it has raised concerns with pesticide users in terms of balancing one 
pesticide against another.   9
The third significant innovation was the consideration of the special sensitivity of 
infants and children to pesticides when setting tolerance levels.  Specifically, the EPA 
is to apply an extra tenfold margin of safety if there is any uncertainty about how a 
substance could affect children.  Last, in the past, tolerances were set such that if 
there was any risk of the pesticide residue posing a risk of cancer, no tolerance was 
allowed.  However, sensitive groups, such as children and pregnant women were not 
considered separately, nor were other serious effects such as produced by estrogen-
mimicking compounds.   
By August 2006, the EPA is to reassess all existing tolerances and exemptions 
from the requirement of a tolerance, for both the active and inert ingredients in 
pesticide products.  The EPA is forcing all chemicals to be re-registered and assessed 
to the new tolerance levels.  Every registered pesticide will then be re-registered on a 
suggested 15-year cycle.  
The FQPA also established an expedited process for safer pesticides such as 
biopesticides, including exempting some AI’s (for example, food products such as 
herbal oils) from registration (EPA, 2006b, c).  As well, the FQPA set aside grants to 
fund pesticide registration for small market ‘minor use’ crops. However the EPA has 
been criticized for not using these provisions to their fullest potential (Benbrook, 2001, 
p4).   
Note that the regulations surrounding tolerances hit some crops more than 
others.  In particular, the production of fresh fruits and vegetables, specifically those 
consumed in proportionally larger quantities by children, are the most affected.  These 
crops also tend to be ‘minor use’ crops – not the large pesticide markets like corn, 
soybeans and cotton.  For example, all fruit uses of methyl parathion were cancelled in 
1999, but grain applications were still allowed (Schierow, 1999). 
One concern with the FQPA is the large amount of latitude left in the hands of 
EPA employees.  The FQPA provides little guidance on how pesticides should be 
weighed against one another, which is particularly important given that tolerances are 
set using a combination of chemicals.  Similarly, for minor use and alternatives, 
employees have a great deal of discretion, implying that firms may not be treated the 
same, or that a change in employee may mean having to redo various aspects of the 
registration.   
 
Canada introduced new legislation in October, 2000 called the Pest Control 
Products Act (PCPA).  The PCPA took many of the fundamental aspects from the 
FQPA, such as the use of the precautionary principle, and the notion that tolerances 
should be set based on exposure from many sources, not just the pesticide in 
question.  It also adopted the idea that tolerances should be set for sensitive groups 
such as children and pregnant women.  Last, it moved to re-register all pesticides, 
comparing them to the new tolerance levels, and will continue to require re-registration 
after every 15 years. 
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A number of differences persist.  Even though the overall philosophy of the 
regulations is the same, the tolerances and registration regulations are different.  Thus, 
if a firm wants to register a pesticide in both US and Canada, they must do testing in 
each jurisdiction, and submit the results to both authorities (the United States does not 
require the data to be submitted while Canada does).  The rules around minor use in 
both countries seem to be bound by a common spirit but its application differs widely in 
each nation, no common applications have been logged so far.  As well, Canada has 
been much slower to adopt expedited processes for safer pesticides, and, although the 
PMRA adopted “reduced risk” language in 2002, they have yet to change their 
registration process to exempt food products or generate other registration tracks for 
pesticide alternatives. 
 
In Mexico, as of December 28
th, 2004, the Federal Commission for the 
Protection against Sanitary Risks (COFRPRIS), a branch of the Department of Health 
is the regulatory agency responsible for registering pesticides.  Residue limits are set 
by both COFEPRIS and the National Institute of Ecology (INE).  The technical and 
environmental data is analyzed by the Department of Environment and Natural 
Resources (SEMARNAT) while the Department of Agriculture (SAGARPA) is 
responsible for assessing the effectiveness of pesticides.    Since March 29, 2005, 
Mexico has adopted a new regulation, the Reglamento en Materia de Registros, 
Autorizaciones de Importación y Exportación y Certificados de Exportación de 
Plaguicidas, Nutrientes Vegetales y Sustancias y Materiales Tóxicos o Peligrosos, that 
governs registration, import and export authorizations and export certificates for 
pesticides, plant nutrients and toxic or dangerous substances and materials. This 
Regulation specifies that COFEPRIS will register pesticides and establish MRLs for 
food by assessing and reviewing pesticide registration applications and data. Until 
further guidelines are established, Mexico may accept USEPA tolerances or Codex 
Alimentarius MRLs (TWG, 2005). 
 
There have been a number of attempts to develop a global set of standards for 
pesticides and plant and animal health.  With the elimination of tariffs, technical 
standards and sanitary (animal) and phyto-sanitary (plant) (SPS) regulations have 
grown in importance.  SPS measures are aimed at ensuring food quality and safety of 
imported commodities to avoid introducing pests (new) into any region or country.   
Their use has been controversial.  In a number of cases they have become tools to 
limit trade.  
 
With the creation of the WTO, and the adoption of the agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures – SPS measures are to be based 
on scientific evidence, non-discriminatory and applied only if necessary.  The WTO 
article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement rules that member-states shall ensure that measures 
do not restrict trade beyond achieving appropriate levels of phyto-sanitary protection. 
The SPS Agreement encourages countries to use existing international standards (eg. 
Codex Alimentarious) and requires scientific justification for standards that are higher. 
Specifically, the country has to show scientific evidence that imports would cause 
potential (plant or animal) health problems.     11
Related to the SPS Agreement, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
(TBT) is meant to define and separate acceptable safety, information and quality 
requirements, from simple barriers to trade.  Like the SPS Agreement, the TBT 
Agreement requires that countries treat imported products the same ways as they treat 
domestic products in terms of their quality, information and safety requirements. Unlike 
the SPS agreement, however, the TBT agreement allows higher standards for a 
number of reasons, including differences in technologies, geography, and does not 
demand the rigorous level of scientific justification required by SPS (Schmitz et al., 
2002).  
 
There are a number of international rules governing the regulations of 
agricultural chemicals.  These rules, such as the SPS and TBT agreements, aim to 
limit the ability of countries to use these regulations as effective barriers to trade by 
creating a harmonized set of standards to regulate the true externalities associated 
with pesticide use.  The OECD has become actively engaged in the harmonization of 
pesticide regulatory frameworks in developed countries (OECD, 2006).  In 1992, the 
OECD established the Pesticide Forum, now called the Working Group on Pesticides 
with the aim of helping countries manage the risks arising from the use and the from 
registration of pesticides.  Canada and the United States have announced last year 
that they will be aiming to harmonize their regulatory systems by region (NAFTA, EU), 
create a system of global data dossiers, and generally make registration in multiple 
countries easier.  Notably, Mexico is not part of the declaration. 
 
Interest Groups and Their Objectives for Harmonization 
 
To be able to determine who is driving (or at least benefiting from) the 
harmonization process, one needs to first understand the objectives of the various 
interest groups involved.  The interest groups we consider include farmers, the 
agrochemical industry, consumers and environmentalists.  As noted above, the 
agrochemical industry is complicated in that there are two types of products: patented 
and generic, and two types of producers: the large, multinational firms involved in 
research and development, who produce both the patented products and the generics, 
and the often country-specific producers and formulators of the generic products.   
Because the producers of the patented products inherently have market power, both in 
producing the on-patent products (by definition) and in producing the generics (by 
licencing arrangements), one has to consider models with market power.  One such is 
Salop’s model on raising rivals costs, where a firm can lobby for (or impose industry-
level) standards that are harder for a rival to meet than for itself.  This strategy is 
particularly relevant in considering harmonization.  Since we also see different prices 
and differential access to products in the three NAFTA countries, we also want to 
consider that firms may be engaging in price discrimination.  We will use these models 
to explore who may win and lose from harmonization of different regulations. 
 
First, let us review the key findings of the raising rival’s costs model.  The model 
is usually predicated on an oligopoly or a dominant firm facing a competitive fringe.  
The firm faces two strategic decisions, to choose quantity/price and to choose the level   12
of a standard for the industry.  One can imagine this occurring by either the firm setting 
a voluntary industry standard or lobbying for a certain level of government regulation.  
The intuition is that by setting a standard that is easier for it to meet than its 
competitors, it can gain a competitive advantage that more than offsets its own 
increase in cost.  This strategy may involve choosing a standard that is actually higher 
than socially optimal.  Consider a regulation that imposes a fixed cost, for example, a 
regulation requiring detailed testing before a pesticide can be brought to the market.  
This kind of regulation is easier for a larger company to meet than a smaller company, 
and therefore may be encouraged by the dominant firm to raise the costs of its smaller 
rivals. 
 
Various authors have shown that this intuition holds for harmonization.  A 
country that favours its domestic industry will argue to harmonize to the level of 
standards for which they have a comparative advantage (Fischer and Serra, 2000, 
Copeland, 2001, Ganslandt and Markusen, 2001 and McAusland, 2004).  Even without 
market power, this may result in standards being set that are stricter than socially 
optimal (Gulati and Roy).  Thus, in our case, one might anticipate that patent protected 
pesticide firms located in the United States would like set regulatory standards such 
that they raise the costs to their counterparts based in Europe and Japan, as well as 
raising costs to generic producers.   
  
The second model we explore is that of price discrimination.  Given the different 
prices and differential access to chemicals in the three countries, and further, given 
that most of the pesticide producers are active in all three countries, one might suspect 
that the (patent) firms are price-discriminating.  In this case, the markets where the firm 
faces the more elastic demand would expect to see the lower price, whereas the 
market with more inelastic demand would presumably see the higher price.  The 
chemicals used in the more important crops in the two countries seem to face lower 
prices (such as canola in Canada and corn in the United States).  If firms are price 
discriminating, they have an incentive to support regulations that effectively block 
arbitrage.   
 
   Note that although price discrimination is often targeted as undesirable by 
consumers, removing price discrimination will raise price as often as it lowers it.   
Assuming that allowing arbitrage would not increase the number of firms active in the 
market, Freshwater and Short, (2005) estimate that the welfare of crop producers will 
go down if price discrimination was removed in pesticides between Canada and the 
United States.  In a number of instances, where the United States currently faces 
higher prices, the decrease in price will be small whereas the offsetting increase in 
price in Canada will be large, due the differences in market size.  They also note that if 
price discrimination were no longer possible, some of the currently low-priced markets 
may no longer have access to the chemical as the price increases past their 
willingness to pay.  Thus, allowing arbitrage without increasing firm entry will not 
necessarily benefit agricultural producers.   
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By improving consumer information on competing goods, standards can 
increase the elasticity of substitution of demand (Harrison et al., 1996; Maskus and 
Wilson, 2000).  Because regulations standardize many of the key product 
characteristics and performance is guaranteed, products become closer substitutes. 
Thus, trade liberalization generates a more elastic increase in demand for imported 
goods under standardization than under non-standardization (Baldwin).  This is of 
particular concern to producers of import-competing products, where a market has 
already been established, and information is already clear to the consumer.  Thus, 
these producers may have a further concern with the harmonization of standards.   
They would also want to block entry into small markets (say for specific crops) where 
they have market power.   
 
Patent firms also have an incentive to reduce the pesticide costs that are 
specific to them, but not to their patent producer or generic counterparts.  Thus, rules 
harmonizing data collection, so firms who are doing the field testing can generate the 
supporting documentation for registration more easily/cheaply would be desirable.   
However, since generic producers have to access the test data from the original patent 
firm, keeping property rights over that data is presumably also important.   
 
Since there is a fixed cost associated with the registration of a certain 
chemical/crop/country combination, pesticide firms have an incentive to concentrate 
their markets.  Therefore they gain from increasing specialization in agricultural 
production.  To do this, they have an interest in harmonizing the product standards 
around agricultural produce, so that tomato trade, for example, can flow freely among 
the three countries.   
 
Because the pesticide producers operate in numerous countries, they have 
experience coordinating activity across several countries.   In this sense, of all the 
interest groups, they are most able to take advantage of an international regulatory 
process. 
 
Domestic generic pesticide producers will presumably want to reduce costs of 
registration, specifically easier access to data to register new products as they come 
off-patent.  That said, they will want to keep barriers to imports, since they tend to 
produce for the domestic market. 
 
The consumers of pesticide products, agricultural producers, generally stand to 
gain from harmonization on pesticide rules due to increased access to chemicals and 
potentially lower price, reducing their cost of production. Export-oriented producers will 
also benefit from harmonized agricultural product standards, reducing existing barriers 
to trade, or the uncertainty associated with potential trade barriers.  By contrast, 
import-competing producers would presumably like the ability to block imports.  Thus, 
they have an incentive to block harmonization of standards to give them a back door 
for protectionism when needed.  Unlike the pesticide manufacturers, agricultural 
producers are primarily organized at a national and/or commodity level, and will 
presumably have less access to decision-making at the international level.   14
The other groups we consider are environmentalists and consumers.   
Environmentalists want to minimize pollution caused by pesticide use and will generally 
want very restrictive rules on pesticide use.  At least some environmentalists will be 
concerned with pollution caused in other countries as well – therefore the 
environmentalists will want to use harmonization to raise standards in all countries.  
That said, environmentalists tend to be organized better at the national level.     
 
The last group we consider are consumers, who we assume care about having 
access to safe food at relatively cheap prices.  Given that objective, our consumers will 
want liberal regulations on pesticides, but tight product standards on food itself.     
Consumers tend not to be well organized into lobbies at either the national or 
international level. 
 
Given the relative influence of the groups internationally, we hypothesize that 
the producers of the patent pesticides will have the largest influence.  If they do, we 
would anticipate that they may use the harmonization to raise their rival’s costs – both 
to other patent producers and to generics.  One way they could raise costs to firms 
from outside NAFTA is by harmonizing to something other than a recognized 
international standard, such as that proposed by the OECD.  They would also want to 
block a move to make it easier for generic firms to register off-patent products.  Thus, 
we hypothesize that they will retain the requirements that firms submit detailed test 
data and preserve strong property rights over that data.  They will want to lower 
requirements where the costs of meeting those requirements primarily apply to them 
(or they have no comparative advantage in meeting these requirements).  This may 
include harmonizing the standards for registration, but retaining the benefit from being 
active in each country.  Similarly, where costs of registration are not sufficient to keep 
out competition, and the domestic firms have no comparative advantage in meeting the 
registration requirements, the firms may lobby to lower the costs of registration. 
However, where registration costs are sufficient to keep out competition, firms already 
in those markets will presumably be interested in retaining those barriers to entry.   
Thus, the firms will likely lobby against harmonization of smaller markets.  Similarly, 
they may want to keep barriers to entry in place against alternative pesticides.   
 
In general, if patent firms are engaging in price discrimination, they will want to 
block harmonization that would allow arbitrage.  Thus, they would want to keep high 
use requirements, and limit the ability of retailers to source chemicals from outside the 
country.  That may include limiting harmonization around labelling, or other country-
specific regulations.  This does not mean that producers of pesticides are opposed to 
all forms of harmonization.  If the pesticide industry is dominating the bargain over 
harmonization, we would expect to see harmonization of product standards around 
agricultural products, to encourage trade in the final goods, and therefore to increase 
the concentration of crops in a single country.   
 
Last, import-competing agricultural producer groups may be able to influence 
the harmonization process to block harmonization with their primary competitors.   The 
lack of common rules around pesticide use gives the import-competing sector a ready   15
excuse to launch a trade dispute when domestic prices are low.  For example, this kind 
of tactic has been used by U.S. growers in avocados and tomatoes against their 
Mexican counterparts.   
 
In the next section, we compare these predictions against what we have 
observed in the harmonization attempts to date.  If we can detect who is benefiting 
from the pattern of harmonization it gives us an indication of who is driving the process. 
 
What We See From Harmonization 
 
In 1996, a NAFTA Technical Working Group (TWG) was established to develop 
a North American market for pesticides by harmonizing pesticide regulation in the three 
countries (TWG, 2001).  The TWG has become a forum to better integrate pesticide 
regulations within the context of each country’s institutions. The group is attempting to 
reach this target by sharing work and reducing the cost of assessing and regulating 
these products for industry and the national authorities.  According to the official 
Mexican document published by the Ministry of Employment, Work and Social 
Prevention (STPS) in 2000, ”the drive aims to harmonize regulations for pesticides, 
assessment criteria and maximum residue levels (MRLs) while sorting out trade 
disputes without compromising health, environmental quality, food quality and the 
development of regulatory capacity” (STPS 2000). 
 
The TWG meets annually with stakeholders, be they from the pesticide industry, 
grower organizations or environmental groups.  There is evidence that patented 
producers, through their industry organization, Crop Life, are highly involved in 
process, while generics and agricultural producers are not.  From the TWG minutes, 
there seem to be key roles adjudicated to global pesticide industry and government 
federal agencies leaving behind farmers, NGO’s and consumers.  For example, the 
Industry Working Group, which represents the pesticide industry at the TWG, has 
made submissions reported in the minutes of every annual stakeholder meeting since 
its creation in 1998, and several executive meetings, whereas representatives from 
growers were reported only in the minutes from the 2001, 2002 and 2003 meetings, 
where they were generally outnumbered by the industry representatives.  There was 
only one submission reported from a representative from alternative agriculture (in 
2001), and, although the World Wildlife Fund has presented at several meetings, in the 
2001 Milestone report, their representative noted that she felt the focus of the TWG 
had been directed too much at facilitating trade, and not enough at promoting better 
environmental outcomes (TWG meeting minutes, various years). 
 
Successful regulatory harmonization has been spotty.  There has been great 
progress made in some areas such as setting common maximum residue limits for 
produce, to allow agricultural goods to flow (reasonably) freely across the border.   
Other areas, such as pesticide registration, have not progressed nearly as far, leaving 
producers in the differing countries facing different pest-control options at different 
prices.  In this section we will walk through the evidence of where harmonization has   16
been successful, and where substantial differences among the regulatory systems 
persist. 
 
First, as evidence that harmonization is still far from complete, we see that pest 
and pesticide regulation are still serving as barriers to trade.  One of the best known 
SPS disputes in NAFTA has concerned the import of avocados from Mexico into the 
United States.  Back in the early part of the last century, a ban on Mexican avocados 
was imposed in the United States after a 1914 discovery of seed weevil in Mexican 
groves.  More recently, concerns have turned to fruit fly infestations in the Mexican 
crop.  At the time, the ban may have been appropriate given control of the two pests 
was difficult. In the meanwhile, the registration of new agrochemicals and the advent of 
integrated pest management (IPM) have allowed for control of the insects and Mexican 
exports to Japan and Canada meet stringent standards based on both strategies.   
Mexico has always maintained that the ban could not be technically justified and was 
kept in place, even against the advice of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), to 
protect U.S. avocado producers in California (Orden, 2004). 
 
The grower lobby, the California Avocado Commission (CAC) fought hard 
against the opening of the U.S. market and managed to impose stringent growing 
regulations for Mexican growers in the State of Michoacán, among them the treatment 
of Mexican avocados with pesticide which ensured high probability of elimination of 
exotic pests, the establishment of pest free-zones, and testing and monitoring on 
Mexican orchards by USDA inspectors.  Finally in 1997, after eight years of 
negotiations, the USDA eased the ban, allowing a small quantity of Mexican imports to 
be sold in the Northeastern United States during winter months, to mitigate pest 
introductions due to adverse climatic conditions.  Over the past few years, the number 
of states has increased and the latest regulatory change in January 2005 meant 
Mexico can export year-round to 47 states.  The ban on exports to California, Florida 




Another illustrative example of SPS issues generating barriers to trade is the 
potato wart, a fungal disease found by the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) in 
Prince Edward Island in 2000 and reported to the USDA under the existing NAFTA 
mechanisms. The CFIA conducted research and showed beyond reasonable doubt 
that the disease was contained and limited to part of a small field in PEI, nevertheless 
USDA implemented a quarantine closing the border to all potatoes from PEI.  The 
CFIA and the U.S. Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), reached an 
agreement to achieve the necessary control and inspection to resume exports to the 
United States, which was later repealed by the Americans. Canada then initiated 
consultations through the NAFTA dispute resolution panel, a bilateral working group 
was established while politicians tried to solve this dispute which affected a perishable 
commodity. Finally borders were reopened after setting up a three year monitoring plan 
                                                 
1 Meanwhile, Chile entered the market, which may have eased the pressure for protection against 
Mexican imports in the United States.   17
by both agencies.  At the time of the dispute, North America had been facing a potato 
surplus and falling prices, which may have contributed to the trade tension. 
 
Domestic pesticide rules can also be used as an effective barrier to trade.  After 
the adoption of the FQPA, in 1999 the EPA placed restrictions on the use and 
tolerance levels for chlorpyrifos.  The tolerances were reduced for apples and grapes, 
but notably, they were removed completely for tomatoes.  Tomatoes were treated 
differently because of the availability of alternatives, along with the fact that tomato 
imports from Mexico had the highest residues of chlorpyrifos (Benbrook, 2001).  Thus, 
it is likely easier for U.S. producers to adopt alternatives than their Mexican 
counterparts.  
 
One result of the lack of harmonization is the persistent price differentials and 
varying degrees of access to pesticide in the three countries.  Canadian farmers, with 
smaller volumes than the United States enjoy lower prices than their American 
counterparts on some products, paying around 60 percent less for glyphosate 
herbicide at retail levels. By the same token, American farmers pay higher prices for 
the insecticide malathion (Freshwater and Short, 2005).  As indicated in the Agriculture 
and Agri-Food Canada Report prepared by McEwan and Deen, price differences 
between U.S. and Canada were recorded for 7 key products, indicating that some 
herbicides were cheaper in Canada but some insecticides and fungicides had lower 
prices in the USA. Most of these products are generics, so one would anticipate that 
patent protected products would have an even greater potential for price 
discrimination.  U.S. farmers have long complained about higher prices in their country 
if compared with Canada, just as Mexican farmers generally complain about higher 
prices in the country if compared with the United States. One key goal of 
harmonization, a North American market for pesticides, has not yet been met. 
 
As two further examples of differences in the markets in the three countries, we 
explore pesticide access in the potato industry in the three countries and the three 
country’s differing reactions to the phase-out of methyl bromide.  Potato wart disease 
and the crop are interesting subjects for pesticide regulatory behaviour analysis in 
NAFTA. The potato crop is grown in the three member countries of NAFTA and is 
imported and exported among Canada, Mexico and the United States. According to 
U.S. potato industry statistics, U.S. exports to Mexico and Canada grew in the first 
years of NAFTA, but 2004, Canada had grown in the U.S. market by supplying growing 
volumes, including higher added value, processed products (frozen potatoes and 
french fries). (Huffaker, 2004)  
 
Growing potatoes is an intensive activity, both in terms of inputs and capital, and 
the crop is host to a wide variety of pests that damage foliage and tubers.   
Agrochemicals are the cornerstone of successful potato farming. Most potato farmers 
rely on chemical insecticides as the base of pest management tactics against soil 
pests.  These insecticides are often formulated as granular products (active ingredient 
sprayed on mineral or bio granule) which are then broadcast at planting time or after, 
usually mixed with fertilizers. A problem with this type of pesticide and their application   18
is that the relative high toxicity of the products and the physical site of application (on 
top soil or below surface) make it easy for wild birds and other species to become 
involuntary targets and be killed.  
 
In the Fraser Valley in Western Canada numerous deaths of eagles and hawks, 
raptors and water fowl have been reported as a result of the application of some 
granular insecticides. (Elliot et al.,1997). An additional source of concern is the effect 
of pesticides leaching to water bodies and ground reservoirs. As a consequence, most 
of these granular insecticides have been banned in Canada and farmers in the region 
are left without tools to effectively control insect soil pests (Vernon, Robert, BC Pest 
Management Assoc, 2006).  
 
Even though potato farmers compete on a global market, Canadian farmers are 
not able to source in Canada the same pesticides as their counterparts in Mexico and 
the United States, leaving them with limited options for pest management and 
impairing their profitability due to a non level playing field across NAFTA.  For example, 
producers in both the United States and Mexico are able to use Phorate, Carbofuran, 
Aldicarb and Fensulphion against soil insect pests in potato production, whereas these 
chemicals are restricted to Western Canadian producers.  
 
A second example of the differences in access to pesticides is the reaction to 
the Montreal Protocol with regards to Methyl Bromide (MB).  This example shows how 
even after agreeing to a common course of action, the relative size of the affected 
domestic industry will lead to different outcomes.   MB is a highly toxic and very 
effective fumigant (biocide) to treat a varied range of pathogens and diseases affecting 
high value agricultural crops for almost 40 years. MB is used mainly as a soil 
disinfectant prior to planting horticultural crops which are very sensitive to losses 
arising from fungus and bacterial diseases but also from insects and weeds; MB is 
injected into the soil and allowed to remain in it under a plastic cover to eliminate 
micro-organisms, weeds and insect pests. It is also used extensively in greenhouses 
for sanitization.  MB plays key role in growing horticultural crops, like strawberry, 
tobacco, asparagus, flowers, potatoes, tomatoes, peppers, cucumbers and other 
produce. The EPA estimates that of all MB used in the USA, over 40 percent goes into 
two crops: tomatoes and strawberries.  
 
As MB degrades ozone, it is a product whose regulation is of truly international 
concern.  Even so, NAFTA member states have not agreed on a common approach. It 
may have to do with the different importance at national level of horticultural 
production, the clout of the chemical producers (and whether these are established in 
the countries).  As part of the Montreal Protocol, an international treaty signed by over 
180 countries designed to control the production and consumption of certain ozone-
depleting substances, including methyl bromide, developed countries around the world 
have agreed to stop its use in their agriculture by 2005.  Since 1997, Canada, a 
relatively small user, has promulgated regulations to meet its Montreal Protocol 
commitments  (PMRA, 2004).  By 2005, Canada had all but banned MB, while Mexico, 
as developing country has the right to a flexible approach but is phasing out MB   19
stepwise by 2015.   The United States on the other hand, a large user and 
manufacturer, has left the door open with a clever clause denominated Critical Use 
Exemption (CUE) where the United States has requested 9,921 tonnes of Methyl 
Bromide be considered ‘critical use’. The global requested critical use exemptions for 
Methyl Bromide total 16,917 metric tonnes, meaning that the United States has 
requested more ‘critical use’ exemptions than all other countries combined. The Bush 
administration has threatened to ignore the treaty altogether if their ‘critical use’ 
demands for Methyl Bromide are not met (Sierra Club, 2006) 
 
After ten years of harmonization efforts, we have three radically different 
approaches to the regulation of a chemical like methyl bromide, Canada, who never 
was a heavy user, has banned the product for agricultural use in 2005 and promotes 
alternative technologies skewed towards Integrated Pest Management, IPM.  The 
Canadian approach usually favours environmental considerations especially since the 
local industry would only be hurt on a small scale. Probably the farm lobby in Canada 
is less powerful than the environmental lobby, a different situation in the USA, itself a 
heavy user in a high value industry and powerful lobbies in the intensive horticultural 
production (strawberries in particular).  
 
Last, consider the insecticide lindane.  By Jan 1, 2005, lindane was no longer 
allowed for use in Canada.  However, at the same time, Mexico still allowed its se for 
parasite control and on livestock, while the United States still allowed its use as a seed 
treatment on corn, wheat, oats and sorghum.  (TWG, 2004).  Although lindane is 
banned for use on canola crops in the United States, the Canadian government's move 
to do the same prompted a suit by Crompton Corporation. The company claims that 
the Canadian government broke an earlier agreement it made through the PMRA. 
Crompton had agreed to stop manufacturing lindane products at the end of 1999 
pending a full PMRA review of the pesticide’s safety, to be completed by the end of 
2000. At the same time, the US EPA was completing its own review and re-registration 
of lindane for a number of other uses in the United States.   In 2001, U.S.-based 
Crompton Corporation sued the Canadian government for banning the chlorinated 
insecticide lindane, seeking US$ 100 million under NAFTA’s Chapter 11 investor-state 
mechanisms.  In a push for ‘harmonization’ of regulations, Crompton Corp.claims to 
have agreed that it would not request the reinstatement of lindane in Canada if both 
the PMRA and the EPA found it unsafe for use on canola. However, the agreement 
also stipulated that if any national agency deemed lindane safe for use on canola, then 
it would have to be reregistered in Canada.  Trade may have had something to do with 
the rule change.  In 1998, the U.S. EPA indicated that it would be illegal to import 
Canadian canola seed treated with lindane into the United States, since treatment with 
lindane was not a registered American use (although its use on other seeds is 
approved). This prompted immediate concern among Canadian canola growers, and 
discussions began among the PMRA, U.S. EPA, Canola Council of Canada and 
Canadian Canola Growers Association and registrants to implement a voluntary 
withdrawal of lindane (NTREE 1999, Natural Life Magazine 2002).  On the other hand, 
others have argued that Crompton saw the Canadian government’s move as a threat 
to its interests in the United States.  While this was occurring in Canada, the Crompton   20
Corporation was aggressively pressing for the re-registration of lindane in the United 
States, and Canada's phase out was seen to threaten their chances. (Pesticide Action 
Network North America, 2006).  
  
Some of the largest differences in access pertain to the registration of safer 
pesticides.  Various alternatives to the traditional pesticides, like naturally derived 
compounds, are not being made available in Canada due to difficulty, length and lack 
of clarity in the registration process. Pesticides made from products that are already 
allowed as food products, such as botanical oils, do not need to be registered.  Neither 
Canada nor Mexico has adopted this exemption as of yet.  Other, safer pesticides can 
be fast-tracked in the United States under the ‘reduced risk’ standards of EPA, which 
encourages the registration of products with low risk profile to users by setting 
incentives like shorter registration process. Known as ‘EPA Reduced Risk Initiative’, 
begun in 1993, it aims at providing incentives to companies to make safer products 
available to the market, environment and consumers. Unfortunately neither Canada 
nor Mexico have brought their approach closer to U.S. guidelines in practical terms; for 
the latter countries have a similar philosophical policy, but no effective way of ensuring 
that safer products get to market faster. Current regulations are the result of evolving 
systems tailored to agro-chemical industry needs, making it difficult to speed-up 
registration of safer products in Canada. 
 
One place where there has been progress is the harmonization of tolerances or 
maximum residue limits (MRLs).   As of 2002-03, the TWG had developed procedures 
for typical irritants around residues (MRL) and availability of products, but going further 
it recently set out to achieve a “North American market for pesticides in which growers 
of the three countries can access the same pest control tools” (Freshwater and Short, 
2005).  By 2001, 12 common MRLs had been established by the TWG, and others that 
have been sources of trade irritants have been targeted (TWG, 2001; TWG, 2005).  
For other MRLs, the TWG is harmonizing data requirements and procedures. 
 
The group has worked to lower the costs of registration across countries 
through work sharing and common registration data submission, tied to a coordinated 
review process. This includes the development of a regional label. However, neither of 
these goals has been reached, the review processes are still separate although some 
progress on data requirements has been achieved between Canada and the United 
States.  Interestingly, data privacy rules have been maintained in the harmonization 
process, meaning that generic companies still need to negotiate with the patent holder 
to access data for registration.  
 
When an agreement has been reached to harmonize, one of the questions 
remaining is which standard to harmonize to.  Probably due to size, although likely 
helped by the location of the pesticide industry, much of the harmonization has 
occurred to U.S. regulations.  In the early 1980´s, pesticide registration in Mexico was 
easier if the chemicals had EPA established residue tolerances, an easy hurdle for 
American chemical companies, as opposed to the European or Japanese companies 
which rely on Codex alimentarius tolerances. By these means, American chemical   21
corporations have had an edge over their European counterparts, who had to engage 
in costly and lengthy negotiations with the regulatory authorities for the establishment 
of local tolerances.  At the same time, Mexican farmers were aware that using products 
without the U.S. tolerances could mean rejection by U.S. buyers or at border controls, 
if residues were spotted.  Thus, even though Mexico has sat as an active member of 
the FAO Codex alimentarius, the body which sets residue tolerances at world level, in 
its regulatory framework has traditionally paid more attention to residue limits set by 
EPA in the United States, its most important trading partner.   
 
Other examples of harmonization to U.S. standards include the Canadian 
adoption of the concept of cumulative exposure in setting MRLs. Similarly, Mexico has 
adopted articles from FIFRA.  Mexico and Canada share some systems for chemical 
residue analysis developed in Canada, while the United States and Mexico employ the 
same IR-4 methods for the establishment of tolerances in the “minor use” sector, as is 
the case of papaya and imacloprid, an insecticide of a relatively new technology called 
neo-nicotinoids against sucking insects. Further, the Mexican government allows 
USDA-APHIS farm inspectors in Mexico, pre-qualifying pesticide application, residue 
levels and pests standards on fruit and vegetable for export. This is still the case for 
tomato, cucumbers, peppers and avocado production in the key states of Sinaloa, 
Guanajuato and Michoacán.  
 
One place where the United States adopted a Canadian rule was with the 
creation of an expedited registration for a fee.  This requirement inherently favors large 
patent producers, given that (a) they have an incentive to register the product as 
quickly as possible, to maximize the usable time of the patent and (b) they can afford 
the fixed cost.   
 
Interestingly, where harmonization has made the greatest leaps has often 
occurred in the private sector.  For example, since President Salinas amended article 
27 in the Constitution allowing “ejidos” communal lands to be sold or rented out, a 
number of U.S.-based industrial producers have expanded to Mexico.  Large U.S. 
producers, brokers and processors of commodities are either contracting out 
agricultural production on Mexican farms or buying the farms to grow crops for urban 
local consumption or for export, under U.S. conditions, including the agrochemical use 
pattern and techniques.  Thus, harmonized pesticide rules are of great value. 
 
American vertically integrated operators in horticulture like tomatoes, peppers and 
broccoli, including packing houses in central Mexico and the North West produce crops 
in line with U.S. pest management programs and specifications. Firms like Del Monte, 
Campbell, Gerber and Heinz were operating successfully in Mexico before NAFTA, 
and the current conditions allow for the mobility of produce and operations between 
regions and countries. 
 
Other examples are consumer product companies like Mars (chocolates, snacks 
and pet food); the company has an ever growing demand for peanuts, the season in 
the United States is short, while in Mexico it can be grown twice a year at lower costs   22
than in the USA. The field managers hand the crop husbandry guidelines including the 
exact Georgia pesticide lists to local suppliers to be sourced and by farmers to be 





Different standards in pesticides and pest protection have often been used as 
trade barriers, whether real or manufactured.  While harmonization is often touted as a 
means to limit rent-seeking by domestic (protectionist) interests, the process itself is 
also subject to rent-seeking, particularly by those interests organized at an 
international level.  In this paper, we present evidence that pesticide rule 
harmonization has been influenced by patent pesticide producers.   
 
Specifically, we argue that in places where harmonization has occurred has 
often served to raise the costs of local firms competing with locally established MNC 
proprietary (patent) producers – whether to generics or to EU/Japanese patented 
competition.  For example, harmonizing regulations to the United States as opposed to 
the OECD creates a comparative advantage for pesticide producers located in North 
America.  As well, harmonizing data requirements while preserving property rights over 
the data lowers the costs of registration facing large firms that hold chemical patents, 
while retaining the barriers to entry facing generics.  Similarly, other harmonization 
efforts, such as around MRLs, serves to aid the chemical industry by increasing their 
market size and concentration. 
 
There is also evidence that patented producers have been able to limit potential 
for arbitrage, preserving their ability to price discriminate.  That said, it is unclear if 
price discrimination actually harms the consumer, and in some cases, eliminating price 
discrimination without decreasing barriers to entry may actually reduce access to 
pesticides in some markets.  The existing difference in pesticide availability is perhaps 
of more concern than differences in price.  Producers, particularly those of smaller 
market crops in the specific country, tend to have many fewer pest control options than 
their counterparts in the larger market.  For those pesticide producers active in those 
smaller markets, it is in their interest to retain those barriers to entry.   
 
Meanwhile, the limited harmonization that has occurred is not sufficient to stop 
domestic rules being used as trade barriers in times of large crops and low prices, as 
in the case of potatoes.  There are interesting possible coalitions between small-
market producers in the United States who have access to pesticides that are 
unavailable in Canada and Mexico and pesticide companies who have exclusive 
product in small-markets in Canada and Mexico.  Thus, one cannot count on pesticide 
manufacturers to counter the pressure from protectionist agricultural lobbies to push for 
small-market access programs. 
 
In conclusion, if harmonization is to improve welfare, the market power 
implications of harmonization need to be considered.  Desired regulatory changes that   23
have the potential to increase market power of some firms could be counterbalanced 
by decreasing other barriers to entry.  For example, given the concerns raised with the 
latitude of officials in determining the exact baselines for registration, improving the 
transparency of the registration processes in all three countries would be a start. 
 
As farmers are the primary consumers of pesticides, increasing their role in the 
harmonization process may help balance the strong voice of the patent industry.   
Particularly producers of small-market crops (which may mean that these producers 
are not organized) should have a key role in setting the priorities for harmonization.  
One area that clearly needs attention is increasing entry, particularly for small-market 
and alternative pesticides.  The U.S. program of expediting and helping fund minor-use 
pesticides has been deemed successful, and while Canada has minor use program, 
there are still numerous farmers without the same pesticide access as their 
counterparts in the United States (such as in the case of potatoes).  Mexican farmers 
potentially face greater barriers since their government does not currently help fund the 
registration of minor-use pesticides.  Canada has also indicated that fast-tracking the 
registration of safer pesticides is a priority, but here again is a place where the United 
States is much further ahead.   
 
That said, complete harmonization is likely not politically possible, nor even 
necessarily desirable.  In those areas where countries cannot harmonize their 
standards, setting clear and transparent rules will help alleviate the ability of those 
rules being used as a tool for rent-seeking.  It is also clear that harmonization is not 
sufficient to limit the push for protectionism.  Thus, there needs to be access to some 
dispute settlement mechanism, whether through the standard NAFTA panel process, 
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